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PROBLEMS IN DRAFTING AND ADMINISTERING
DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS
Richard R. Endacott*
A discretionary trust is one which gives the trustee the au-
thority to exercise his own judgment in applying certain provisions
contained in the trust instrument. Discretionary provisions are
most prevalent in regard to the trustee's authority as to time,
manner, amount or circumstances of payment of income or princi-
pal to certain beneficiaries.
By giving the trustee discretionary power, the settlor can secure
several advantages. First, he can equip the trustee to deal with
reasonably foreseeable, unforeseeable, and emergency situations.
For example, the trustee can be given the discretionary power to
invade principal in behalf of the beneficiary in order to pay unex-
pected medical expenses, or to meet the expenses of higher educa-
tion.
Secondly, income tax savings can be effected by the use of dis-
cretionary trusts. If the trust provides for multiple income bene-
ficiaries, the trustee in his discretion can either distribute or ac-
cumulate income according to the respective income tax brackets
of the different beneficiaries. Only those amounts distributed to
the beneficiaries would be taxable to them, while the income re-
tained in the trust would be taxed to the trust. Under this flexible
arrangement, the trust can serve as a significant tax-saving entity
in the interest of the beneficiaries.
Although these and certain other advantages which are inher-
ent in discretionary trusts have been widely recognized, the practi-
cal problems involved in drafting and administering such trusts too
frequently are given insufficient consideration. As is the case with
almost everything else, the discretionary trust has both its pluses
and minuses. Therefore, in those cases where its use seems to ful-
fill a specific need, every effort should be made to maximize the
potential advantages and minimize the possible disadvantages.
Perhaps the most difficult problem connected with discretion-
ary trusts is that of communicating the settlor's true intentions from
settlor to draftsman to trustee. To solve this problem, the draft-
ing of the language of the trust instrument must be so precise and
clear that subsequent interpretation by the trustee-and possibly
by the courts-will accurately carry out the settlor's intentions.
* A.B., 1960, University of Kansas; LL.B., 1963, Yale University; Associ-
ate, Mason, Knudsen, Berkheimer and Endacott, Lincoln, Nebraska.
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Accomplishing this objective requires careful thought and drafting,
mainly because of the subjective nature of the word "discretion"
and the subjective standards (such as "support," "education," "com-
fort," and "happiness") upon which the trustee is required to base
the exercise of his discretion.
A Nebraska case which typifies the problems encountered in
trying to accurately interpret the intent of the settlor is In re Sul-
livan.1 This case involved an action to compel the trustees of a
testamentary trust to pay the wife and minor child of the named
beneficiary sufficient sums for their support and maintenance.
The will stated:
My said executor or executors shall securely and properly invest
and re-invest said trust estate, or any part thereof available for
such purpose, in good and valid investments under orders from the
county court in which this instrument is admitted to probate, and
they shall apply the proceeds or income therefrom for the proper
use, support and maintenance of said son, Lawrence P. Sullivan, as
the same is received by them or as his needs may require or
necessitate, and for that purpose may use and apply any part or
portion of the principal of said trust estate from time to time as in
their judgment may be required or necessary therefor, they being
the sole judges of such necessity without applying to the courts
for authority so to do, and I declare that said executors shall have
full and uncontrolled discretion as to the application of said income
and trust estate for the uses aforesaid.2
Even though the will gave the trustee "full and uncontrolled
discretion" and mentioned nothing about support of the wife and
child, the court held that the "support and maintenance of said son,
Lawrence P. Sullivan" included his wife and child, and stated
that the failure of the trustee to support them was "arbitrary."
The supreme court ordered the district court to require the trustee
to pay for the support of Lawrence Sullivan's wife and child.
This case is typical of the administrative and legal problems
which a trustee must face in order to determine and fulfill the
intent of the settlor. Particularly, it illustrates the difficult prob-
lem of interpreting such subjective terms as "proper use," "sup-
port," "maintenance," "needs," and "full and uncontrolled discre-
tion."
In order to draft discretionary trust provisions which will
eliminate, or at least reduce these problems, the draftsman, of
course, must be clearly apprised of the settlor's true desires and in-
tent. In addition, he must possess a thorough understanding of
1 In re Sullivan, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943).
2 Id. at 37-38, 12 N.W.2d at 149. (Emphasis added.)
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the legal meaning of each term which he chooses to employ in
order to correctly and clearly express this intent. This knowledge
will enable the draftsman to anticipate the administrative and legal
interpretations which probably will be placed upon these terms,
and he will therefore be able to determine their proper use in the
instrument. Furthermore, he will recognize the need for, and pro-
vide clarification, emphasis, and additional definition where needed
to lend support for significant terms and language.
This article will examine the meanings of the most common
terms used in discretionary trusts, and will attempt to point out
some ways in which these terms can be utilized to avoid some of
the problems mentioned above.3
I. DISCRETION
The first consideration in a discretionary trust is the question
of just how much discretion is to be bestowed upon the trustee.
The cases clearly indicate that the chances of judicial review of the
trustee's discretion are reduced as the amount of discretion con-
ferred upon the trustee is increased.4 Thus, if the draftsman lim-
its the discretion of the trustee and thereby makes the decisions of
the trustee more likely to be subject to judicial review, he en-
hances the ability of the beneficiary to enforce rights to which he
feels he is entitled, but of which he may have been deprived. On
the other hand, if the settlor has intended to bestow liberal bene-
fits, stipulations of limited discretion in the trustee will enhance
the trustee's fear of surcharge and thus make him more reluctant
to confer the liberal benefits actually intended. Thus the settlor,
in determining the amount of discretion to be employed, must bal-
ance the desirability of protecting the trustee from judicial review
against the desirability of giving the beneficiary easier access to
the courts to protect rights to which he feels he is entitled.
3 It hardly need be pointed out that to define these terms with complete
precision is virtually impossible. This is not only because the courts
of different states have placed different meanings on the same terms,
but also because the meaning of these terms can vary in accordance
with their context and the over-all impression of intent created by the
complete instrument.
4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 560 at 125 (2d ed. 1960); Halbach,
Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1425,
1430-33 (1961); ABA, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRUSTEES' ABSO-
LUTE AND UNCONTROLLED DISCRETIONARY POWERS, COMMITTEE ON TRUST
ADMINISTRATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF TRUSTEES, PROCEEDINGS OF PRO-
BATE AND TRUST LAW DIVISIONS, SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE
AND TRUST LAW 185, 187 (1965) (hereinafter referred to as the ABA




The degree of discretion conferred is usually determined by the
presence or absence of such words as "sole," "absolute," and "un-
controlled" in conjunction with the word "discretion." The absence
of such terms limits the trustee's discretion, and therefore the use
of the unmodified term "discretion" will be referred to as "limited
discretion."
To the extent that the trustee has "limited discretion," a court
will not interfere so long as the trustee's exercise of such discre-
tion is reasonable.5 Furthermore, judicial intervention is not au-
thorized even though the court would have exercised the discretion
differently. 6 The Nebraska Supreme Court has followed this rule:
The mere fact that if the discretion had been conferred upon the
court, the court would have exercised the power differently, is not
a sufficient reason for interfering with the exercise of the power
by the trustee.7 '
However, the courts will intervene if the trustee abuses his dis-
cretion. This rule is summarized in the following quote from the
Restatement of Trusts as cited in the case of Scully v. Scully.8
As stated in Restatement, Trusts, § 187, comment e, p. 481: "If
discretion is conferred upon the trustee in the exercise of a power,
the court will not interfere unless the trustee in exercising or fail-
ing to exercise the power acts dishonestly, or with an improper
even though not a dishonest motive, or fails to use his judgment,
or acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment."9
In determining the question of whether the trustee is guilty of
an abuse of discretion in exercising or failing to exercise a power,
the Nebraska court again adheres to the Restatement guidelines:
Also, as said in Restatement, Trusts, § 187, comment d, p. 480:
"In determining the question whether the trustee is guilty of an
abuse of discretion in exercising or failing to exercise a power, the
following circumstances may be relevant: (1) the extent of the
discretion intended to be conferred upon the trustee by the terms
of the trust; (2) the purposes of the trust; (3) the nature of the
power; (4) the existence or non-existence, the definiteness or in-
5 BOGERT, TRuSTS § 89 (3d ed. 1952); ScoTT, TRUSTS § 187 (abr. ed. 1960);
Scully v. Scully, 162 Neb. 368, 76 N.W.2d 239 (1956).
6 Scully v. Scully, 162 Neb. 368, 76 N.W.2d 239 (1956); In re Vohland, 135
Neb. 77, 280 N.W. 241 (1938); Rowe v. Rowe, 219 Ore. 599, 610, 347 P.2d
968, 974 (1959); Estate of Genung, 161 Cal. App. 2d 507, 326 P.2d 861
(Dist. Ct. 1958).
7 In re Vohland, 135 Neb. 77, 86, 280 N.W. 241, 246 (1938), quoting RE-
STATEmENT, TRUSTS § 187, comment e (1959).
s Scully v. Scully, 162 Neb. 368, 76 N.W.2d 239 (1956).
9 Id. at 375, 76 N.W.2d at 245.
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definiteness, of an external standard by which the reasonableness
of a trustee's conduct can be judged; (5) the motives of the trustee
in exercising or refraining from exercising the power; (6) the ex-
istence or non-existence of an interest in the trustee conflicting
with that of the beneficiaries."' 0
In sum, although there is a wide area within which the trustee
may determine whether or not to act and when and how to act, be-
yond that area the court will control him. The extent of that area
of discretion depends upon the terms of the trust, the nature of
the power, and all of the circumstances.
B. ABSOLUTE DISCRETION
The discretion of the trustee may be expanded by giving the
trustee "sole," "absolute," or "uncontrolled" discretion. Nebraska
has adopted the Restatement rule as to the authority of the
trustee when he is given such expanded discretion. The Restate-
ment rule, as quoted in In re Sullivan," is as follows:
We think a correct statement of the law appears in Restatement,
Trusts, sec. 187 (j), wherein it is said: "The settlor may, however,
manifest an intention that the trustee's judgment need not be exer-
cised reasonably, even where there is a standard by which the
reasonableness of the trustee's conduct can be judged. This may be
indicated by a provision in the trust instrument that the trustee
shall have "absolute" or "unlimited" or "uncontrolled" discretion.
These words are not interpreted literally but are ordinarily con-
strued as merely dispensing with the standard of reasonableness.
In such a case the mere fact that the trustee has acted beyond the
bounds of a reasonable judgment is not a sufficient ground for
interposition by the court, so long as the trustee acts in a state of
mind in which it was contemplated by the settlor that he would
act. But the court will interfere if the trustee acts in a state of
mind not contemplated by the settlor. Thus, the trustee will not
be permitted to act dishonestly, or from some motive other than
the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust, or ordinarily to act
arbitrarily without an exercise of his judgment."' 2
Thus, this standard emphasizes the "state of mind" of the settlor
and declares that the "reasonableness" of the trustee's action is
not the test. However, the Nebraska court in the Sullivan case,
and numerous courts in other jurisdictions which condemn "capri-
cious" or "arbitrary" action by the trustee, seem to be applying
criteria not unlike the norm of "reasonableness.""
-0 Id. at 375-76, 76 N.W.2d at 245.
11 In re Sullivan, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943).
12 Id. at 39-40, 12 N.W.2d at 150.
18 Lyter v. Vestal, 355 Mo. 457, 196 S.W.2d 769 (1946); In re Sullivan, 144
Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943); In re Ledyard, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 860 (Surr.
Ct. 1939); Rinkers v. Simpson, 159 Va. 612, 166 S.E. 546 (1932); In re
Koos, 269 Wis. 478, 69 N.W.2d 598 (1955).
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In sum, the difference between limited discretion and absolute
discretion seems to be one of degree rather than kind.' 4 Under
both types of discretion, the action of the trustee must not only
conform to the "state-of-mind test," but also to some degree of rea-
sonableness.' 5 However, it seems clear that the courts presume
the trustee to have broader discretionary authority when the dis-
cretion is "absolute." 16
One of the primary objectives of the draftsman in giving the
trustee absolute discretion is to accord the trustee sufficiently broad
powers that he will be generous with the primary beneficiaries
without being in fear of future surcharge from remaindermen.
This can be accomplished by clearly stating in the trust that certain
beneficiaries are to be considered primary and others subordinate.'7
Also, it can be stated that any good faith distributions to primary
beneficiaries are to be absolutely binding upon all other bene-
ficiaries.' 8 This alternative would protect the right of the primary
beneficiaries to petition the court if the trustee should be too con-
servative as to them, and would tend to develop a more liberal
attitude on the part of the trustee toward the primary beneficiaries
because of the virtual elimination of the danger of surcharge from
future or subordinate beneficiaries.
A further device which might be employed if the testator is
primarily concerned about certain beneficiaries is to state that the
trustee is to be "liberal" toward them. This liberality can even be
extended to the point of allowing complete exhaustion of principal
14 ABA, REPORT ON DiscRETIONARY POWERS, supra note 4, at 187; Halbach,
Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 1425,
1433 (1961).
15 In re Sullivan, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943). In the ABA, REPORT
ON DiScRETIONARY POWERS, supra note 4, at 187 it was stated: "Mem-
bers of the committee who interviewed trust officers reported that there
were no discernable differences of approach in the exercise of discre-
tion based on whether the governing standard was 'state of mind' or
reasonableness. Moreover, most trust officers appeared to regard
their rights and duties no differently when their discretion was abso-
lute than where it'was not." (Footnbte omitted.) See, Halbach, supra
note 14, at 1432.
16 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEES § 560 (2d ed. 1960); Halbach, supra note
14, at 1430-33; ABA REPORT ON DIScRETIONARY POWERS, supra note 4,
at 187; Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 1383, 1408-10 (1948).
17 Halbach, supra note 14, at 1432. ABA, REPORT Or THE SutcoM1wnTEE ON
TESTAMzENTARY TRUSTS FOR INcoME TAX SAViNG, COMrMTTEE ON ESTATE
AND TAX PLANNING, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW DIvIsIONs, SECTION OF
REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW 79, 88 (1965) (hereinafter
cited as ABA, REPORT ON TESTAmENTARY TRUSTS).
18 ABA, REPORT ON TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS, supra note 17, at 90.
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if the trustee determines that the needs of certain beneficiaries
meet the standards set out in the instrument.
Ir. THE INTENTION OF THE SETTLOR--STANDARDS
FOR THE TRUSTEE'S GUIDANCE
Standards, which are typically couched in terms of the bene-
ficiaries' needs or requirements-such as support, education, wel-
fare, etc.-are an appropriate means of expressing the intent and
scope of a discretionary power. Standards serve as a helpful guide
to the trustee in the exercise of his discretion and, if properly used,
will serve to inform the trustee of the purpose of the trust, the
type and extent of benefits to be conferred, and the various factors
to be considered.
A. Lnrm STmDRs
(1) Support and Maintenance19
Perhaps the most common standard used in trusts is that of
"support and maintenance." In using such terms, however, the
draftsman should specify the precise nature and extent of such
support and maintenance. If this is not done, it is generally estab-
lished that the courts will conclude that such standards extend sup-
port beyond the bare necessities of life and that the beneficiary is
to be maintained in accordance with his station in life, at least to
the extent that the size of the trust fund allows such a degree of
support.20 It has been suggested by one of the leading authorities
in this area that "station in life" probably means support similar
to that enjoyed at the time an inter vivos trust was created, or, in
the case of a testamentary trust, during the settlor's lifetime.21
The Nebraska court has not been specific in defining "support
and maintenance" in connection with trusts. However, it appears
that the Nebraska rule is generally in accord with the general rule
stated above. In Roats v. Roats,22 the court stated that "'care and
19 The courts have interpreted "necessities" and "needs" to be substan-
tially similar to "support and maintenance." In re Sullivan, 144 Neb. 36,
12 N.W.2d 148 (1943); Orr v. Moses, 94 N.H. 309, 52 A.2d 128 (1947).
20 Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Eaton, 36 F.2d 710, 711 (2d Cir. 1929);
Hicks v. Jones, 138 N.J.Eq. 280, 47 A.2d 894 (Ch. 1946).
21 Halbach, supra note 14, at 1434; Sibson v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust
Co., 61 N.J. Super. 88, 160 A.2d 76 (Ch. 1960), modified 64 N.J. Super.
225, 165 A.2d 800 (App. Div. 1960).
22 128 Neb. 194, 258 N.W. 264 (1935); see also Lighthill v. McCurry, 175
Neb. 547, 122 N.W.2d 468 (1964); In re Sullivan, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d
148 (1943).
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support' are very broad terms, and may be restricted or enlarged
according to the necessities of the beneficiary."
The draftsman must also specify to whose benefit these stand-
ards are to be applied. Nebraska has made it clear that "support"
includes provision for support of persons relying upon the benefi-
ciary for support in normal family situations.23
It must be kept in mind that the terms "support and mainte-
nance" although not limited to necessities, do not encompass ex-
tremely liberal or luxurious benefits (that is, unless the bene-
ficiaries' station in life has been such as to encompass such bene-
fits). It has been held that such standards do not include pay-
ments which merely contribute to the beneficiaries' happiness, con-
tentment and peace of mind.24 Thus, the draftsman may not safely
conclude that these terms will encompass such luxuries as expen-
sive European trips, vacation homes, and the like.
Perhaps this problem can best be avoided by using other in-
herently more liberal standards such as "comfort" or "happiness";
by further defining the extent of "support and maintenance" in-
tended as "good," "comfortable," or "generous"; or by stating in
detail the upper limits of support, e.g. support shall include routine
vacations encompassed in the accustomed manner of living.
(2) Emergency and Casualty
The term "emergency" is more limited than "support" and has
been construed to mean an extreme need which calls for immediate
action.25
In Pyne v. Payne, the Nebraska court held that the term "cas-
ualty" embraces only those things which are a departure from what
may be regarded as foreseen or foreseeable contingencies. 26
Due to the scarcity of cases defining these terms, their meaning
is even more uncertain than some of the more common discretionary
standards. Therefore, the use of such terms requires additional
definition and perhaps the use of particular examples.
238 In re Sullivan, 144 Neb. 35, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943); First Nat'l Bank v.
Howard, 149 Tex. 130, 229 S.W.2d 781 (1950); Robison v. Elston Bank
& Trust Co., 113 Ind. App. 633, 48 N.E.2d 181 (1943).
24 Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Wentworth, 99 N.H. 346, 111 A.2d 198 (1955).
25 In re Tone, 240 Iowa 1315, 39 N.W.2d 401 (1949); In re Shiel, 120 N.Y.S.
2d 632 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
2 152 Neb. 242, 40 N.W.2d 682 (1950).
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(3) Education
The term "education" as a standard should be expanded to
state specifically the type and level of formal schooling contem-
plated, and whether or not the settlor intended the term to in-
clude other broadening activities which provide an educational
benefit, such as travel. In the absence of such explanation, it is
difficult to state how the courts would interpret "education." In
one leading case, it was limited to that schooling "associated with
youth and the instruction received from their teachers. . . [and is]
the general and formal word for schooling . . . especially in an
institution of learning.27 However, a fairly recent case states the
more common rule that "education is a broad term and is not
limited to knowledge acquired in the classroom. '28 An unanswered
problem in regard to "education" is whether it is to extend to those
whom the beneficiary is required to support.
(4) Health
Although "health," or "medical and surgical needs" would
come within the ambit of "support and maintenance," 29 these terms
add specificity and thus should be included if these needs are in-
tended to be covered by the settlor.
B. LIBERAL STANDARDS: COMFORT, WELFARE, BENEFIT, HAPPINESS
Use of broader terms such as "comfort, welfare, benefit and
happiness" may allow the trustee to be more liberal and thus be-
stow some additional benefits.30 There are many cases which gen-
erally hold that "happiness," "welfare" and "comfort" are synony-
mous.3 1 These terms have been held to mean "a state or condi-
tion in regard to well being. '32 They have also been construed to
mean "ease, contentment, or enjoyment."3 3 In some instances, they
have been extended to mental, emotional and spiritual happiness.
27 New Britain Trust Co. v. Stoddard, 120 Conn. 123, 127, 179 Atl. 642,
643 (1935), citing WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY.
28 Willheat v. Fite, 341 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. 1960); see also Hooker v. Parkin,
235 Ark. 218, 226-27, 357 S.W.2d 534, 540 (1962).
29 In re Sullivan, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943).
80 Blodgett v. Delaney, 201 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1953); Rock Island Bank &
Trust Co. v. Rhoeds, 353 Ill. 131, 187 N.E. 139 (1933); Equitable Trust
Co. v. Montgomery, 28 Del. Ch. 389, 44 A.2d 420 (1945).
31 Combs v. Carey, 287 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1955); In the Matter of Buell, 198
Misc. 358, 66 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Surr. Ct. 1946); National Surety Co. v.
Jarrett, 95 W. Va. 420, 121 S.E. 291 (1924).
32 United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962).
33 Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1964).
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For example, in United States v. Powell,3 4 the court stated that
comfort, welfare and happiness were synonymous. With respect to
happiness, it said: "Happiness, in the full sense, is mental or spir-
itual or both. . .. -135 It seems that these cases now allow extreme
liberality by the trustee, for these terms seem to require him to
provide not only for the physical well-being of the beneficiary, but
also for his mental and emotional contentment and well-being.
An excellent example of the liberal meaning of these terms is
contained in Combs v. Carey.3" In that case, the trustee was given
the authority to invade the- trust principal for the settlor's daugh-
ter's comfort, welfare and happiness. The daughter had for many
years maintained an "extremely high standard of living." She
lived in a luxurious hotel in New York City, maintained a chauffeur
and several maids, and traveled and entertained extensively. In
holding that the trustee had properly exercised its discretion to
invade, the court stated:
All that is necessary to authorize invasion of the corpus is that
Mrs. Walsh convince the trustee that such an invasion is necessary
to her "happiness" . . . . While the language used in the trust
instrument may not have created a prudent standard to guide the
trustee in the administration of the trust, yet it is the standard
chosen by the settlor, and the one followed by the trustee.37
The term "benefit" usually is also construed to allow for liberal
payments by the trustee. It was stated in In re Emmon's Will that:
Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, First Series, vol. 1, p. 751,
has the following: "'Benefit,' as used in a will directing payment
of income to one for his own use and benefit of property, is a
much broader word than 'support,' and has no such limited mean-
ing as the word 'support.' It is thus defined in Worcester: 'Advan-
tage; gain; support;' and its manifest signification is anything that
works to the advantage or gain of the recipient." 38
There are several possible problems which must be considered
in employing such liberal standards as comfort, welfare, happiness,
benefit, etc. In several recent cases, the Internal Revenue Service
has argued that these standards are so broad that the trustee's
authority is unlimited and that state courts would consider it an
abuse of the trustee's authority for him to refuse a beneficiary's
34 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962).
35 Id. at 827.
36 187 S.W.2d 443 (Ky. 1955).
37 Id. at 445.
38 165 Misc. 192, 195, 300 N.Y.S. 580, 584 (Surr. Ct. 1937). See also,
Warren v. Webb, 68 Me. 133, 135 (1878); In re Rachlin, 133 N.Y.S.2d
151 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
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request based on these standards.3 9 If the courts were to compel
the trustee to conform to the beneficiary's wishes in every case, the
beneficiary would be considered to have a taxable power of ap-
pointment. However, this argument has been unsuccessful since it
is very questionable that a trustee with absolute discretion and
subject to the control of the court would be considered subject
solely to the direction of a beneficiary.40
A further problem in regard to these liberal standards is the
possible loss of a charitable remainder deduction because the dis-
cretionary authority of the trustee to invade principal was so
broad that the amount of the charitable remainder could not be
computed with sufficient accuracy to sustain the deduction. The
law on this point is very well summarized in a chart at the end of
the opinion in Kline v. United States.41 Generally, it can be stated
that the terms "welfare, comfort, benefit and happiness" result in
denial of the charitable remainder deduction. 42
IIL OUTSIDE RESOURCES
The question of whether the settlor intended the trustee to
take into consideration the outside resources of the beneficiary in
regard to the question of invasion of principal has proved a source
of much litigation.43 In the absence of any statement in the trust
on this point, the general rule is stated in Scott on Trusts as fol-
lows:
Where the trustee is directed to pay to the beneficiary or to apply
for him so much as is necessary for his maintenance or support, the
inference is that he should receive his support from the trust es-
tate, even though he might have other resources.44
39 Security-Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. Pa.
1965); Lettice v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 123 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
40 In Security-Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 40, 47 (W.D.
Pa. 1965) the court stated: "Rather the Pennsylvania rule appears to
be that in a proper case, after considering the instrument creating the
trust and ascertaining from it the donor's or testator's intentions; and
considering the circumstances calling for the exercise of discretion, a
Pennsylvania court can compel a Trustee's exercise of discretion to
carry out the donor's or testator's intention, and conversely, under the
proper circumstances, it will uphold the refusal of the Trustee to make
payments under discretion granted it."
41 202 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. W.Va. 1962); see also Rev. Rul. 385, 1960-2
CUm. BULL. 77.
42 Kline v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. W.Va. 1962).
43 ScoT, TRUSTS § 128.4 (2d ed. 1956).
44 Id. at 939.
DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS
The Nebraska rule is stated in Roats v. Roats45 as follows:
It is contended that the plaintiff has other funds which she can call
in and use to care for her every need .... The provision of the
mother in her will, setting up this $4,000 cash fund for the benefit
of her daughter, did not provide that the trust fund should not be
used until the daughter had first exhausted all other funds she
might have, if any, but empowered the trustee not to hold and re-
tain .... Equity and good conscience whisper that, in case of
doubt in construing such a provision in a will, it is better to err
in favor of the beneficiary, and against the trustee, than other-
wise.46
The careful draftsman will want to eliminate any doubt on
this point. He should spell out in detail what outside income or
principal the trustee must or may consider in making a discretion-
ary decision. Of course, a desire for liberality on the part of the
trustee would require the trustee to disregard outside resources.
However, to blindfold a trustee in this manner would reduce the
advantage of flexibility. If maximum flexibility is desired, the will
should give the trustee the option either to consider or disregard
outside resources. In a tax-motivated trust, it would be a serious
mistake not to authorize the trustee to take other resources into
consideration. Without such authorization, unnecessary distribu-
tions might be made to beneficiaries resulting in unnecessary in-
come tax burdens which the discretionary trust was employed to
avoid.
45 128 Neb. 194, 258 N.W. 264 (1935).
46 Id. at 198, 258 N.W. at 266-67.
